Serbia’s parties on the mend? That state of intra-party democracy in before and after regime change by Spoerri, Marlene
 Balkanologie
Revue d'études pluridisciplinaires 
Vol. XI, n° 1-2 | 2008
Volume XI Numéro 1-2
Serbia’s parties on the mend? That state of intra-







Association française d'études sur les Balkans (Afebalk)
 
Electronic reference
Marlene Spoerri, « Serbia’s parties on the mend? That state of intra-party democracy in before and
after regime change », Balkanologie [Online], Vol. XI, n° 1-2 | December 2008, Online since 31 December
2008, connection on 30 April 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/balkanologie/1453 
This text was automatically generated on 30 April 2019.
© Tous droits réservés
Serbia’s parties on the mend? That
state of intra-party democracy in
before and after regime change
Marlene Spoerri
1 Almost a century after political parties’ devolution into oligarchy was declared inevitable,
rosy portrayals of political parties’ democratic attributes remain few and far between. In
old  and new democracies  alike,  political  parties  are  widely  regarded as  corrupt  and
opaque organizations, rarely practicing what they preach.1 Perhaps for this very reason,
the past two decades have witnessed renewed interest in the inner workings of political
parties. Unwilling to accept the deterministic theses offered by Ostrogorski, Michels and
others,  scholars  have sought  to  explore  the dimensions  and prospects  of  intra-party
democracy. According to some, intra-party democracy is not only desirable, it is possible.
Proponents argue that not only are internally democratic parties more likely to select
capable leaders, but that they are better positioned to achieve electoral success. In new
democracies where public confidence in the political system tends to be low, intra-party
democracy is thought to add much needed legitimacy to the democratic process, as well
as to encourage an otherwise apathetic citizenry to take greater part in politics. Building
on such claims,  this  paper  examines  the  state  of  intra-party  democracy  in  one new
democracy, that of Serbia. 
2 Since the onset of multiparty politics in 1990, political parties have been both a promoter
of and a hindrance to what little political progress has been made in post-communist
Serbia. Many believe that a lack of intra-party democracy is at least partly to blame. Some
have even gone so far as to assert that parties’ democratic deficits have compromised the
country’s democratic trajectory.2 Certainly there is widespread agreement that during
the period under Slobodan Milosevic’s semi-authoritarian rule, parties on either side of
the political spectrum were prone to oligarchy, if not outright autarchy. Not only were
they  highly  centralized  and  prone  to  exclusivity,  but  in  many  cases  party  leaders’
authoritarian tendencies ostracized the very individuals upon whom their support was
meant  to  rest,  a  phenomenon  which  undoubtedly  hurt  rather  than  helped  Serbia’s
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democratic opposition.  Yet  the  very  same  parties  who  suffered  so  blatantly  from
democratic deficits in the 1990s lay at the forefront of Serbia’s democratic transition in
October  2000,  paving the way towards  regime change and overseeing the process  of
democratization which followed. Has the onset of democracy in Serbia facilitated the
democratization of the country’s main political parties? By most accounts, the answer is
no.  Robert Michels’ ‘iron law of oligarchy’  thus appears all  too relevant in a Serbian
context. This paper seeks to understand whether and to what extent this remains the case
in a post-Milosevic context. Have Serbia’s political parties evolved organizationally since
the early 1990s? Are parties’  organizational  structures uniformly undemocratic or do
differences exist with respect to different parties? To answer these questions this paper
relies  on  domestic  media  coverage,  interview with  party  members,  as  well  as  party
statutes. Before delving into the specifics of Serbia’s political parties, the case for (and
against) intra-party democracy is laid forth.
 
Intra-party Democracy
3 Studies of intra-party democracy explore how political parties govern themselves. This
includes how parties reach the decisions they make, what steps they take to ensure that
those decisions are in tune with the will of their membership, and the lengths to which
they go to protect the rights of members who do not share the majority opinion. More
specifically, intra-party democracy, also known as internal party democracy, refers to
those mechanisms that  make parties’  governance processes more inclusive and more
representative of the party membership in its entirety. Studies of intra-party democracy
focus  on  one  or  more  of  the  following  three  dimensions  of  party  organization:
inclusiveness, referring to how extensive or representative the group of party decision-
makers is; centralization, or how often decisions are made by only a single body3; and
institutionalization, pertaining to how formalized the procedures of governance are.4 An
internally democratic party is likely to boast governance methods which are inclusive, at
least  partially  though  not  necessarily  wholly  decentralized,  and  institutionalized.  By
contrast,  parties  that  suffer  democratic  deficiencies  tend towards  exclusivity  (with a
limited, unrepresentative set of party members holding decision-making powers), go to
extremes in either centralization or decentralization (to such a degree that the final
outcome does not reflect the will of the general party membership), and/or tend to be
poorly institutionalized (although the opposite may also be true, as rules of exclusivity
may be firmly in place).
4 Exploring how political parties govern themselves is invariably a complex, if not daunting
task.  Given  the  multiplicity  of  methods  and  mechanisms  whereby  parties  seek  to
democratize  such  processes,  providing  an  exhaustive  illustration  of  the  state  of
intraparty democracy is no doubt impossible. This analysis therefore limits itself to the
three most significant sets of choices parties can make when crafting their organizational
structures and practices. These include choices pertaining to: selection,  or how parties
decide  on  which  policies  to  uphold,  candidates  to  recruit,  or  leaders  to support;
accountability,  meaning  how parties  ensure  that  the  individuals  and  policies  selected
remain responsive to the will of the party membership; and tolerance, referring to how
parties respond to competing perspectives or opinions from within party ranks. Though
the vast majority of scholarly research focuses on selection procedures, mechanisms to
ensure accountability and tolerance within political parties are arguably no less central to
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internal party democracy. After all, a party which boasts inclusive selection procedures
but has not institutionalized the means by which to hold the selected accountable to the
party membership cannot be said to be fully democratic, nor can a party which allows for
inclusive internal suffrage but denies members the right to express their dissent in an
organized fashion. The following pages examine the range of choices Serbia’s political
parties have made with respect to methods of selection, accountability, and tolerance.
Each of  these  is  assessed  in  light  of  the  three  dimensions  of  intra-party  democracy
(inclusivity, decentralization, and institutionalization) discussed above. 
5 Bille writes that “it is common in politics for the written rules to be one thing, while the
practice actually adopted when decisions are made and implemented is quite another.”5
As such, this paper relies not only on party statutes but also first-hand interviews with
party members and domestic media reports, both of which help to elucidate the state of
intra-party democracy in practice. Still, it would be foolish to overstate the accuracy of
even the most thorough of such analyses. Reliable empirical data is often hard to come by
given  the  wealth  of  unofficial  and  more  importantly  untraceable  channels  at  party
leaders’ disposal. In this respect, what Gallagher and Marsh call the ‘secret garden’ of
politics  extends  far  beyond  candidate  selection  alone.6 Indeed,  for  all  of  scholars’
attempts  to  shine  light  on  the  subject,  internal  party  politics  remains  shrouded  in
mystery.
 
Intra-party Democracy: Why it Matters
6 In  spite  of  the  limitations  confronting  the  study  of  intraparty  democracy,  scholars
continue to devote serious attention to it. This is because advocates argue that intraparty
democracy matters, not only for parties themselves but also for the larger democratic
process. Arguments for intra-party democracy stem from these two separate modes of
logic,  one instrumental  and the other normative in nature.  As pertains to the latter,
authors such as Bille argue that how parties govern themselves internally has a direct
bearing on the larger democratic process. As he explains, “It is hard to understand how a
regime can be classified as  democratic  if  the political  parties  have an organizational
structure that leaves no room for citizens to participate and have influence. The decision-
making  process  within  the  parties,  that  is,  the  degree  of  internal  party  democracy
becomes an interesting and even crucial  issue for analysis.”7 For parties to facilitate,
rather  than hinder,  the  democratic  process,  they  must  therefore  practice  what  they
preach. A similar argument is put forward by Augustine Titani Magolowondo, who writes
that internal party democracy is one of a handful of institutional guarantees that parties
must “fulfill if they [a]re to effectively meet what is expected of them in a democracy.”8
Such normative lines of argumentation derive from the conviction that in drawing their
members into the fold of the decision-making process, the distance between the elector
and  the  elected  is  narrowed,  and  the  legitimacy  of  the  democratic  process  thereby
enhanced.  
7 A second line of defense of intra-party democracy pertains to its instrumental value.
Unlike an oligarchic party, in which decisions regarding policy and candidates are made
by a small elite or even a single individual, democratic parties incorporate their members
into the decision-making process. Not only do they have a say in who represents them,
but methods of accountability ensure that members also have a say in how they are
governed. Should they disagree with their representatives or fellow members, they are
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free to voice such disagreements as they see fit. Members of democratic parties thus have
a stake in both the policies that their parties’ promote and the candidates who represent
them.  This,  in  turn,  awards  political  parties  a  competitive  edge.  This  includes  party
leaders  and candidates  who are  thoroughly  vetted  and widely  admired,  policies  and
platforms that reflect the needs and interests of the party’s membership, and a large,
dependable  pool  of  human  and  financial  resources  with  which  to  launch  electoral
campaigns. Writes Susan Scarrow, “…parties using internally democratic procedures are
likely to select more capable and appealing leaders, to have more responsive policies,
and,  as  a  result,  to  enjoy  greater  electoral  success.”9 Yet  not  everyone  is  equally
convinced. 
8 Critics of intra-party democracy tend to fall into one of three camps: those who think it is
impossible to achieve, those who believe it is undesirable, and finally, those who warn
that it is ultimately harmful.  Members of this first camp include two of the subject’s
founders:  Michels  and  Ostrogorski.  Both  were  stark  critics  of  parties’  ‘oligarchic’
tendencies but found the pursuit of internal party democracy to be destined for failure.
Hence Michels’ unsettling conclusion “that this cruel game will continue without end.”10
Whereas the first camp desires intra-party democracy but questions its feasibility, the
second questions its very desirability. To this group of skeptics belong veritable party
experts  such  as  Schattschneider  and  Sartori,  both  of  whom  argue  that  intra-party
democracy  is  irrelevant  to  the  larger  pursuit  of  democracy.  For  Schattschneider  the
implementation  of  intra-party  democracy  would  be  as  self-defeating  as  would  an
employer’s wish to meet the demands of the employee at the expense of the consumer.
Democracy, after all, exists between, not within, political parties. Members of the third
camp go one step further. Critics such as Duverger and McKenzie argue that intra-party
democracy threatens to make parties more vulnerable to internal strife, decreasing their
efficiency and unity, and undermining their electoral competitiveness. In the words of
Duverger, “Democratic principles demand that leadership at all levels be elective, that it
be  frequently  renewed,  collective  in  character,  weak  in  authority.  Organized  in  this
fashion, a party is not well armed for the struggles of politics.”11 The critique offered by
May differs in its origins, but is no less damning. According to May’s law of curvilinear
disparity, parties that follow the will of their staunchest supports do so at their own peril.
12 For May, party activists are partisan ideologues who seek to tilt the party to one polar
extreme or another, the ultimate effect of which is the disenchantment of the average
voter and a reduction of the party’s overall competiveness. For this latter group of critics,
intra-party  democracy  is  not  merely  unfeasible  or  undesirable,  it  poses  an  outright
danger to political parties.
 
Intra-party Democracy: Why it is Necessary in Serbia 
9 Undoubtedly, the aforementioned arguments pose significant questions for advocates of
intra-party democracy and deserve ample consideration. Yet for all their value, they are
unpersuasive when applied to the subject of new democracies, where the issue is less
about establishing intra-party democracy as such and more about the democratization of
parties’ governance processes. Indeed, if the major parties of Western Europe and North
America are said to be oligarchies, than those of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union tend towards autocracy. Writing in 1995 Kopecky predicted that the organizational
form most likely to emerge in post-communist Europe would be one in which members
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played only subsidiary roles and leaders were dominant.13 The work of van Biezen has
confirmed these predictions.14 Throughout much of the post-communist world, parties
are little more than personalized vehicles of self-aggrandizement, bearing scant identity
apart from that which their leader bestows. In such an atmosphere, even basic measures
to widen the circle of decision-makers and expose party leaders to minimal oversight—
while certainly falling short of the vision of internal democracy sketched above—would
be a vast improvement. This is because new democracies, particularly those to emerge
from the ashes of communism, suffer from the very same problems efforts to democratize
party life help remedy.    
10 To  say  that  citizens  of  post-communist  Europe  have  been  disillusioned  by  post-
communist politics is to state the obvious. Distrust of political parties runs high, as does
dissatisfaction with democracy.15 By almost any measure, whether one looks at the level
of voter turnout, the strength of party membership, the degree of party identification, or
the stability of voting patterns, support for party systems in the post-communist world is
lacking. Serbia is certainly no exception in this regards. 
11 In a 2005 study conducted by the Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID), 63
percent of respondents declared themselves to have no trust in political parties.16 An
even higher  number—65 percent—expressed no trust  in executive authority.  While  a
majority of those polled (57 percent) stated that they could identify with at least one
party in Serbia, 43 percent could not. A 2006 opinion poll conducted by the International
Republican Institute found similarly worrisome results. When asked about corruption in
Serbia’s parliament, almost 70 percent of respondents answered that the “majority of” or
a  “considerable  number  of”  MPs  were  corrupt.17  Less  than one  in  four  respondents
believed that  corruption was confined to “only a  small  number of  individual  cases”.
Dissatisfaction with the status quo has led some in Serbia to question the very desirability
of democracy. Although the CESID study found that 42 percent of respondents favored
democracy to other forms of government, 20 percent stated that non-democracies were
better in some cases, and 14 percent answered that non-democracies and democracies
were  equal.  There  can  be  little  doubt  that  lingering  suspicions  of  their  political
representatives deserve at least part of the blame for such sentiments. 
12 According to Zsolt Enyedi “Most scholars suspect that behind the generally low level of
popularity of party politics stand the weak linkages between parties and social groups.18
Intra-party democracy has the potential to help parties address these issues. On the one
hand, greater internal democracy means greater transparency and accountability, both of
which serve to bolster parties’ democratic credentials and add to their legitimacy. On the
other  hand,  stronger  links  between  party  leaders  and  members  may  encourage  an
otherwise apathetic citizenry to partake in the democratic process. This in turn might
facilitate the stabilization of partisan attachments, ultimately reducing electoral volatility
and strengthening voter loyalty.19 Given the prospect that the democratization of parties’
internal governance processes may positively contribute to Serbs’  confidence in their
party system, identifying existing democratic deficits is vital. The upcoming section does
precisely this by laying out the state of internal party democracy in Serbia today. This is
followed by a comparative analysis sketching the differences and similarities between
political parties before and after regime change in an effort to understand how Serbia’s
parties  have  responded  organizationally  to  the  onset  of  their  country’s  democratic
transition.
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The State of Intra-party Democracy Today
13 Serbia’s first post-communist elections were held in December 1990. By that time, dozens
of political parties had already sprung into action, most boasting no more than a handful
of members. Over the course of the next two decades hundreds of political parties would
be registered throughout Serbia, the vast majority of which would never make it into
parliament. Of the parties that did, the following seven were arguably most important
and will be the focus of this analysis: the Democratic Party (DS), the Democratic Party of
Serbia  (DSS),  the  G17  Plus,  the  Liberal  Democracy  Party  (LDP),  the  Serbian  Renewal
Movement (SPO), the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS).
The differences between these parties were and remain extreme. While in the 1990s the
SPS boasted unlimited access  to  state  media,  parties  such as  the  DSS and SPO went
virtually ignored. Whereas the SRS remains an ongoing proponent of a Greater Serbia, the
LDP calls for full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and has demanded that Serbia recognize the independence of Kosovo. Yet for
all their differences, the parties which emerged in the aftermath of communism continue
to share much in common, particularly when it comes to their internal make-up. This
section provides an overview of the state of intra-party democracy today, beginning with
a brief introduction to parties’ basic organizational structures.
14 Like  their  counterparts  in  Western  Europe,  Serbia’s  parties  are  each  composed  of  a
number of party organs that oversee party life, the most important of which are the party
assembly (also known as the congress), the main board, the presidency, and the executive
board.20 In addition, specific party functionaries—the party president in particular—take
on considerable (one might argue, excessive) authority and thus assume as organ-like
status in their own right. Understanding how party authority is shared between each of
these organs is the first step in uncovering the state of intra-party democracy in Serbia.
15 The party congress is the largest organ of the party, ranging from some six hundred
members (DSS) to three thousand (SRS). Meeting once every two to four years, it is in the
party congress that party platforms are approved, statutes are ratified, and party leaders
are elected. In practice however, congress’ functions are ceremonial. Its true authority
lies  in the rubberstamp with the ratification of  key party documents  and leadership
positions following little, if any, deliberation. By contrast, the main board is smaller in
size but boasts greater responsibilities.  In almost all  parties,  this includes the task of
establishing  party  politics  and  approving  party  strategy,  including  whether  to  enter
republican-level coalitions with political adversaries. In some parties (the G17 Plus and
SPS in particular), the main board enjoys truly significant prerogatives. For the SPS this
includes the right to propose and confirm who in the party will serve as a member of
parliament (MP). Yet such institutional arrangements are the exception rather than the
rule. In most cases, the powers of the main board pale in comparison to those of the party
president and presidency, who are often responsible for the formulation of party policy
and strategy,  as  well  as  the  proposal  of  party  candidates  and high functionaries.  In
general, it is the party president and his or her inner circle that is responsible for crafting
party positions on pressing issues, with other party organs signing off on their decisions.
 Finally, the power of the executive organ tends to focus on oversight of local party work,
including appointment of local party leaders as well as their dismissal.  The following
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pages provide further clarification of the implications of such institutional arrangements
for the state of intra-party democracy in Serbia today.
 
1. Selection Procedures
16 To understand the level of intra-party democracy in Serbia, it is necessary to examine the
choices parties make with respect to: leadership selection, candidate selection, and policy
selection. The following pages explore the lengths to which Serbia’s political parties go to
incorporate their members into each of these processes.
 
Selecting Party Leaders
17 Political parties in new democracies are often dominated by strong leaders and Serbia has
proven to be no exception in this regard.21 In Serbia, party presidents play a central role
in virtually all of the most meaningful decisions parties make. It is not uncommon, for
example,  for  party presidents  to be tasked with filling the most  important  positions
within  their  parties,  as  well  as  dictating  the  work  party  organs  conduct.22 In  some
instances, parties themselves have little identity save in terms of their presidents, hence
the fact that most major parties in Serbia have never experienced a change in leadership.
The means by which parties determine who their leaders are is thus one of the more
important aspects of a party’s organizational life.  
18 Table 1 provides an overview of  parties’  leader selection processes as  pertain to the
election of party presidents. Perhaps the most telling conclusion that can be drawn from
the table is just how few parties clearly delineate the process of leader selection. Indeed,
one  of  the  foremost  problems  afflicting  the  process  is  a lack  of  institutionalization.
Under-institutionalization manifests itself in two respects: rules are either unspecified in
party statutes or they are disobeyed in practice. As pertains to the former, part statutes
are often unclear about who has the capacity to nominate a party leader and how such a
nomination may be initiated.  
19 Where party  rules  are  explicitly  stated,  they are  often violated in  practice.  A prime
example of this is the rule of secret ballot. While all party statutes stipulate that party
leaders are to be elected by secret ballot, the actual secrecy of such ballots is
questionable. The SRS statute, for example, states that party presidents will normally be
elected by secret ballot, and only in exceptional cases is election by public acclamation
acceptable.23 In practice, it is the latter which is the norm and the former the exception as
the SRS president is almost invariably elected by public acclamation in the SRS assembly.
More worrisome is the DS, whose statute states that voting will be conducted exclusively
by secret ballot.  However,  the DS’s 2004 assembly meeting caused a stir  when major
violations of the electoral process were leaked to the press.24 It was alleged by the DS
President of the Electoral Committee, among others, that prior to their submission the
ballots  of  assembly  delegates  from  local  municipalities  were  screened  by  municipal
presidents.  Suspicions were further aroused in 2006 when in the days preceding the
assembly meeting documents were uncovered which revealed the precise outcome of the
assembly’s decisions.
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Table 1: Leader Selection Procedures25
  DS DSS G17 LDP SPO SPS SRS
Procedures for electing party presidents are implemented at the:
National level only     - - - - X
National and Sub-national levels X X - - - -   
Sub-national level only     - - - -   
Candidates for president are nominated by:
Electoral Committee   - - - - - X
Main board   - - - - -   
Municipal Boards X - - - - -   
Assembly   - - - - -   
All party members   - - - - -   
Presidents are elected by:
Electoral Committee               
Main board               
Assembly   X X X X X X
All party members X             
Presidents are elected by virtue of:
Public acclamation             X
Secret ballot X X X X X X X
Leader Selection rules are:
Entirely undefined in statute               
Unclearly stipulated in statute X   X X X X  
Clearly  stipulated  in  statute  but  deviated  from  in
practice
  X         X
Clearly stipulated in statute and upheld in practice               
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20 The DS affair shone the spotlight on some very unsettling practices. In 2006, the party
responded by unveiling a dramatic step towards greater intra-party democracy: the
introduction of the primary system. Beginning in 2010, DS presidents will be elected by all
party members through a secret ballot system. This represents a major departure from
standard practice.  At present,  elections of party presidents remain highly centralized
affairs occurring at a single meeting on a national scale. This meeting point is of course
the assembly.26 Although staging an election of a party president in an assembly allows
for greater inclusivity than it would the main board or presidency it is still a far cry from
a truly inclusive election procedure, which would include the party membership in its
entirety. For the proponents of intra-party democracy, one can only hope that the DS is
setting a trend which its rivals will follow in years to come.
 
Selecting Party Candidates
21 Of  no  less  vital  concern  for  proponents  of  intra-party  democracy  is  the  matter  of
candidate  selection.  In  any  representative  democracy,  one  of  political  parties’  most
important functions is that of recruiting individuals (i.e. candidates) who will run for
office in their name.27 Table 2 provides an overview of MP selection methods. As can be
seen, the process is inordinately centralized, exclusive and in contrast to leader selection
processes, well institutionalized. There is little variation across the political spectrum in
the process of MP selection, with the notable exception of the SPS.  For most parties, the
party president or presidency plays the central role by determining the potential pool of
party MPs. It is thus this small party elite (in some cases, one individual) which draws up
the list of MPs prior to an election. Although it is ultimately up to the main board to
approve that  list,  they often do so with little  deliberation.  The SPS is  the only true
exception in this regards, in so far as its statute awards the party’s main board the right
to propose the draft of MPs, in addition to the right to confirm them.
 
Table 2: Candidate Selection
  DS DSS G17 LDP SPO SPS SRS
Process of MP selection conducted at: 
National level only X   X X X X X
Sub-national and National levels   X           
Sub-national level only               
Electoral list of MPs proposed by: 
President X     X X   X
Presidency   X X X       
Main board           X   
Municipal boards X28 X29           
Serbia’s parties on the mend? That state of intra-party democracy in before a...
Balkanologie, Vol. XI, n° 1-2 | 2008
9
Electoral list of MPs approved by:
President               
Presidency X             
Main board X X X X X X X
Assembly               
Rules for candidate selection are:
Entirely undefined in party statute               
Unclearly stipulated in party statute       X       
Clearly stipulated in party statute but deviated from in
practice
              
Clearly  stipulated  in  party  statute  and  upheld  in
practice
X X X  X X X
22 Serbia’s  parties  are not  bound by law to respect  the MP list  presented to voters  on
Election Day.  Thus,  once the votes are tallied and the number of mandates assigned,
parties are free to pick and choose amongst their members as they see fit. In some cases
(for example, the SPS), party statutes explicitly state that the final list of MPs may deviate
from the electoral list. Few parties are explicit however in how mandates will ultimately
be awarded. The DSS is an exception here, in so far as its statute states that the electoral
list must be respected.
 
Selecting Party Policy
23 Another crucial aspect of intra-party democracy concerns the processes through which
policy positions are crafted and selected. In more inclusive parties the rank and file is
actively  engaged  at  each  step  of  the  policy  making  process.  Understanding  who
contributes to this process is central to uncovering the state of intra-party democracy in
Serbia today. As Table 3 illustrates, the process of policy selection in Serbia is a top-down
affair that suffers from a lack of institutional clarity. Although party statutes leave much
to be desired with respect to clarity, it is evident that policy positions are crafted by the
president and presidency and require the approval of the main board. Local municipal
boards have little say in the process outside of their representatives’ membership in these
organs. 
 
Table 3: Policy Selection
 DS DSS G17 LDP SPO SPS SRS
Policymaking processes incorporate the viewpoints of: 
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National organs only X X X X X X X
National and Sub-national organs               
Sub-national organs only               
Initial proposals for policy positions incorporate the viewpoints of:
President X   X X   X
Presidency X X X X  X   
Policy deliberation committee X X X X X X   
Main board   X           
Assembly     X         
All party members               
Policy positions approved by:
President X           X
Presidency               
Policy deliberation committee               
Main board X X X X X X   
Assembly               
All party members               
Rules for determining policy positions are:
Entirely undefined               
Unclearly stipulated X X X X X X   
Clearly stipulated in party documents but deviated from
in practice
              
Clearly  stipulated  in  party  documents  and  upheld  in
practice
            X
24 The  precise  actors  involved  in  the  formulation  of  policy  positions  vary  per  party.
 Although the president or presidency are invariably most determinative, in most cases
parties have established specific advisory councils who play a role in formulating party
positions. The precise composition (i.e. inclusivity) of these councils varies per party. The
parties boasting the most inclusive of such councils are the LDP, SPO and SPS, each of
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which incorporates both party members and non-party members. The LDP’s statute even
makes explicit mention of nongovernmental organizations.30 Other parties have taken a
more exclusive approach by demanding that members of policy advisory councils also be
members of the party. Unfortunately, the precise magnitude of these councils’ decision-
making powers is generally left unspecified in party statutes. Only in the DSS and DS are
such councils awarded the status of party organ. In other parties, they are assigned only
advisory powers and their decisions can thus be assumed to carry little weight. Nowhere
do statutes stipulate that the proposals of the advisory board must be included in policy
proposals, nor do they demand that these proposals be so much as considered by the
main board. It is thus unclear to what effect they may be.
 
2. Accountability
25 All forms of representative democracy involve a trade-off between those who govern and
those  who are  governed.31 In  the  modern state  citizens  award impressive  powers  to
political parties in exchange for guarantees of political accountability. According to the
proponents of intra-party democracy, the authority of political party leaders should rest
on a similar trade-off. Mechanisms must therefore exist through which party leaders can
be held accountable to the party membership. This means, among other things,  that:
internal elections are free and fair;  rules for the removal of party leaders are clearly
codified; internal checks and balances exist and are fully functional and; key leadership
positions are assigned fixed term limits. Serbia’s political parties fail in each of these
respects. 
26 As was previously discussed, internal party elections in Serbia are neither free nor fair. In
most cases, the rules of electoral conduct are either unwritten or violated to such an
extreme that their democratic character is jeopardized. This paper has argued that the
under-institutionalization of the electoral process is in large part to blame. However,
fraudulent elections are not the only respect in which Serbia’s political parties fail to live
up to  the  norms  of  democratic  accountability.  As  Table  4  illustrates,  the  process  of
removing party leaders is no less problematic. As is the case with election procedures,
rules governing the removal of party presidents are often left undefined in party statutes.
Thus for the SPS and DSS, allrules pertaining to leader removal are conveniently absent,
while for the G17 Plus and LDP they are only partially so. For both of these parties, while
their  assemblies  are  tasked with the power to  remove party presidents,  how such a
procedure might be initiated is left unclear. 
27 This is rectified in the cases of the DS, SPO, and SRS, where the rules for the removal of
party presidents are clearly laid out in party statutes. However, almost two decades of
multiparty politics suggests that such rules are rarely, if ever, upheld in practice. After
all, not a single leader of any one of these parties has ever faced so much as a single vote
of no confidence. Thus, despite the fact that he has been confined to a prison cell in the
Netherlands for the past five years, the authority of Vojislav Seselj—President of the SRS
—has  yet  to  be  called  into  question.  Similarly,  despite  having  been  defeated in
presidential elections on five separate occasions, the position of Vuk Draskovic as SPO
party president remains firmly intact.  Such facts suggest that even where procedural
rules exist, they have few practical implications for the accountability process.
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Table 4: Accountability
  DS DSS G17 LDP SPO SPS SRS
The process of removing a party president occurs at:
National level only X X - X   -   
National and Sub-national levels     -   X - X
Sub-national level only     -     -   
Procedures to remove a party president be may initiated by:
Presidency   - - -   -   
Main board X - - - X - X
Municipal boards     - - X - X
Assembly X   - -   -   
Referendum (i.e. all party members)     - -   -   
Final authority to remove a party president
Presidency           -   
Main board           -   
Municipal boards           -   
Assembly X X X X X - X
Referendum (i.e. all party members)           -   
Rules for removing a party president are:
Entirely undefined in party documents           X   
Unclearly stipulated in party documents   X X X       
Clearly stipulated in party documents but deviated from
in practice
X       X   X
Clearly  stipulated  in  party  documents  and  upheld  in
practice
              
28 Perhaps the most worrisome of political parties’  democratic deficits is the absence of
functional checks and balances. Even when rules regulating the means for their removal
exist, the powers of party presidents go virtually unrestrained. Much of the problem lies
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in the extensive freedoms party presidents are awarded with respect to the appointment
or so-called ‘recommendation’ of top party functionaries. In the G17 Plus, for example,
the president has the right to propose up to 60 permanent members of the main board.32
In the DSS the prerogatives of the president stretch even further; he or she is charged
with nominating all members of the presidency (including all the party’s vice presidents),
up to 24 members of the main board, three members of the party’s monitoring board, as
well as all members of the party’s disciplinary commission.33 No less impressive are the
powers of the SPO president who nominates members of the presidency34,  the party’s
general secretary and director, the president of executive board, as well as the party’s
vice president. In the LDP, the party president has the right to nominate an unlimited
number of members to be co-opted by the party’s main board.35 In addition, he or she
may recommend members of the presidency, the secretary of the party, as well as the
secretary of the presidency.36 In the case of the DS, the party president is charged with
selecting candidates for deputy president, vice president,  members of the presidency,
president of the executive board, secretary and director of the party, secretary of the
presidency, and members of the political council.37 The powers of the SRS president are
no doubt most impressive. He or she can suggest candidates for the deputy president,
main board, statutory commission, monitoring board, presidency, secretary general, vice
presidents of main board, ten members of the executive board, and state functionaries.38
Even for the SPS, which boasts the weakest party president, members of the presidency
are elected at the suggestion of the party president.39 Although presidential prerogatives
are generally limited to the power of nomination rather than appointment, in practical
terms  it  is  the  party  president  who  is  responsible  for  filling  the  most  significant
leadership functions within the party. As a consequence, they are often able to install
loyal party members who are unlikely to question, let alone threaten, their authority.
This  phenomenon  strengthens  party  leaders’  positions  horizontally  and  ultimately
undermines any notion of checks and balances within the party.
29 The poor record of accountability in Serbia’s political parties is further exacerbated by
the lack of presidential term limits. No statute in Serbia stipulates a given number of
years or terms after which a party president must step down. Thus, three of the eight
parties under review have never experienced a change in leadership. This means, among
other things, that Vojislav Kostunica, the president of DSS, has maintained his position
for 16 years, while Vojislav Seselj has been SRS president for 17 years, and Vuk Draskovic
the president of the SPO for 18 years. Having the possibility to be ‘leader for life’ does
little to encourage leaders to accommodate other (popular) personalities in their party.
Such individuals, no matter how qualified, are likely to be seen as potential competitors,
and thus edged out of party life. A prime example of this occurred in 2004, when an up-
and-coming member of DSS, Zoran Drakulic, rescinded his membership to the party. Over
the course of  just  a few months time,  Drakulic had gained a reputation as an active
reformer  seeking  to  change  his  party  from  within.  Although  his  message  had  ample
supporters—he outperformed the rest of his party in city-wide elections held that year—
Drakulic’s  success  stood  to  “endanger  the  internal  equilibrium  inside  DSS  and,
unavoidably, called the existence of the steadfast party leader [Kostunica] into question.”
40 After learning that, despite Kostunica’s personal assurance to the contrary, he would
not be nominated as the party’s vice president, Drakulic gave up his membership to the
DSS and took an early exit from politics. When potential alternatives to party presidents
are  pushed  out  of  party  life  in  this  fashion,  the  entire  discussion  of  accountability
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becomes purely academic. After all, if party presidents can rest assured that rivals do not
exist within their midst, they have little reason to fear for their removal.
 
3. Tolerance
30 One of the basic principles of intra-party democracy concerns the right of party members
to voice their opinions openly and without fear of reprisal. Ideally, it also means that
members have the right to organize on the basis of those opinions, even to form factions




  DS DSS G17 LDP SPO SPS SRS
Party members whose opinions differ from the majority:
Have  a  right  to  express  such  opinions  within  the
confines of the party
X - X X - X -
Face expulsion for expressing such opinions publicly X - X  - X X41
Have a right to express such opinions publicly - - - X - - -
Are permitted to organize on the basis of such opinions - - - - - X -
Have a right to form factions - - - - -  -
Members of parliament are:
Required  to  sign  an  agreement  with  the  party
stipulating their rights and duties  
- - X - - - -
Required to vote in accordance with decisions made by
the party organs
X X X X X X X
MPs are allowed to vote in parliament contrary to the
majority decision of the party
- - - - - - -
Rules establishing the freedom of opinion of party members and MPs are:
Entirely undefined in party documents   X     X   X
Unclearly stipulated in party documents X   X X       
Clearly stipulated in party documents but deviated from
in practice
              
Clearly  stipulated  in  party  documents  and  upheld  in
practice
          X   
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31 As can be seen, Serbia’s parties fall into one of two groups: those whose statutes are (at
least partially) explicit with regards to members’ freedom of opinion, and those who are
entirely silent. To the former category belong the DS, G17 Plus, LDP, and SPS and to the
latter,  DSS,  SPO,  and  SRS.  In  contrast  to  the  former,  the  latter  group’s  statutes
concentrate  solely  on  membership  duties,  in  particular  members’  commitment  to
upholding party  policies  and programs.  While  the  DSS statute  makes  no mention of
members’  rights  to  independent  opinion,  for  example,  it  explicitly  states  that
membership will  be revoked as  a  consequence of  the failure to abide by the party’s
decisions.42 One can only assume from this that tolerance for internal dissent in these
parties is low.
32 By contrast the statutes of the DS, G17 Plus, LDP and SPS are more forthright with regards
to  the  limits  of  their  tolerance.  While  each of  these parties  permits  its  members  to
express their opinions in the confines of the party, only the LDP goes so far as to allow
them to speak freely in public.43 Arguably, however, the most liberal political party when
it comes to internal dissent is the SPS which, like all parties in Serbia, does not permit
factions but does allow members to form groups on the basis of their divergent opinions,
as doing so “contributes to internal party democracy”.44 Although it is unclear on how a
faction may be  distinguished from a  group,  explicitly  protecting  members’  rights  to
organize on the basis of minority opinions is quite unprecedented in Serbia.   
33 Statutes aside, parties’ failure to tolerate differences of opinion is well known. Although
the SPS is the only party to state this explicitly, all parties in Serbia forbid the formation
of factions. In many respects, however, their intolerance goes far beyond this. Although
in theory  most  parties  respect  differences  of  opinion amongst  their  membership,  in
practice, individuals who are particularly vocal or steadfast in adhering to a minority
opinion are unlikely to have a future in their party. This was most recently exhibited with
the departure of Maja Gojkovic, the popular mayor of Novi Sad, from the SRS. But it is also
visible in other parties, including the G17 plus and DS. A 2006 rift amongst members of
the G17 Plus concerning the party’s decision to support the government despite its failure
to  apprehend  Ratko  Mladic  ended  in  the  ouster  of  those  party  members  who  had
supported the losing side (in this case, this included the party’s then-president, Miroljub
Labus). In December 2004 the DS revoked the membership of Cedomir Jovanovic and his
supporters after they attempted to form a liberal democratic faction within the party.
Parties’ inability to accommodate competing perspectives within their midst is in fact a
leading reason that  so many members go on to form their  own parties.  The DS,  for
example, in addition to spawning the DSS and LDP, also accounted for formation of the
Serbian Liberal Party and Democratic Center. The incessant formation of new party spin-
offs  compromises  the  stability  of  Serbia’s  party  system  and  calls  the  democratic
legitimacy of many parties into question. 
34 The section has demonstrated that with respect to the areas of selection, accountability,
and  tolerance,  Serbia’s  parties  are  largely  centralized,  exclusive  and  under-
institutionalized. Parties are centralized in so far as their decision-making processes are
often conducted in a single party organ on a national level. Local branches rarely have
much, if any, say as to how their parties are run. Serbia’s parties are exclusive to the
extent that average party members have little access to the levers of the decision-making
power and are rarely asked to contribute to the decisions their parties’ makes. Finally, it
had also been shown that Serbia’s parties are under-institutionalized in so far as the rules
governing governance processes are either poorly elucidated or violated in practice.
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35 Clearly,  the state of  intra-party democracy in Serbia leaves much to be desired.  This
verdict applies to all major parties in Serbia, irrespective of ideology or size. Thus the
LDP, which holds just 13 seats in parliament and espouses libertarian ideals, shows little
sign  of  being  substantially  more  democratic  than the  SRS,  which  boasts  78  seats  in
parliament  and  advocates  a  nationalist  ideology.  By  contrast  the  SPS—no  less
nationalistic  than  the  SRS  but  significantly  less  successful  (it  has  just  12  seats  in
parliament)—is not less democratic than the DS, the self-proclaimed leader of Serbia’s bid
for  EU  membership.   While  slight  variations  no  doubt  exist  with  respect  to  specific
dimensions of internal governance—the SPS and LDP, for example, being slightly more
tolerate  of  internal  dissent,  the  G17  Plus  and  the  SPS  boasting  somewhat  weaker
presidents, and the DS employing what will soon be the most inclusive leader election
process—such differences  are  the  exception  not  the  rule.  There  is  little  evidence  to
suggest that any party in Serbia so much as resembles an internally democratic party. 
36 That said, an analysis which concentrates solely on the current failings of intra-party
democracy says little about the direction in which Serbia’s parties are headed. Without
understanding how parties’ organizational practices have evolved since their founding,
we can say little about the prospect for further reform. Nor can we gauge the degree to
which  the  onset  of  democracy  in  Serbia  has  impacted  upon  parties’  organizational
development. The following section therefore offers a comparative perspective on the
state of intra-party democracy before and after regime change.
 
A Comparative Perspective
37 By  now  it  has  become  clear  that  political  parties  in  Serbia  suffer  from  enormous
democratic deficits. Their governance processes are centralized, exclusive, and under-
institutionalized.  Today’s  parties  are,  without exception,  internally undemocratic.  Yet
this assessment is not without its share of caveats. To say that Serbia’s parties are entirely
oligarchic,  even  autarchic,  would  be  an  overstatement.  Certainly  there  are  faint
indications that Serbia’s parties do indeed see the need to democratize at least some
aspects of their organizational life. Hence the DS’s decision to introduce a primary voting
system and the LDP’s explicit consent for party members to speak their minds’ publicly.
But is there evidence to suggest that we are witnessing a gradual democratization of
internal governance processes? Have parties become any more democratic or perhaps,
less oligarchic, since the onset of democracy in Serbia? 
38 Yes and no. In some respects Serbia’s parties are certainly better institutionalized and
less centralized today than they were at the outset of multiparty politics in 1990. Yet
there are also indications that Serbia’s parties are actually less democratic than they were
almost  two decades ago.  To verify these seemingly contradictory trends,  this  section
begins by examining the state of intra-party democracy in the 1990s.
39 Of the seven political parties examined in this study, all but two (the LDP and G17 Plus)
can trace their roots to the years either immediately preceding or following Serbia’s first
multiparty elections held in 1990. These parties’ most formative years were thus spent in
the highly politicized environment of Milosevic’s Serbia.45 During this period, political
parties  were free  to  exist  but  did  so  amidst  an onslaught  of  political,  financial,  and
physical  hurdles  aimed  at  undermining  their  popular  appeal.  Serbia’s  democratic
opposition  responded  to  such  pressures  by  launching  large-scale  political  protests
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engaging thousands of citizens for weeks and sometimes months at a time. For parties to
launch such protests effectively, they relied on a personalized form of politics based on
their leaders’ popular appeal and charisma. According to Vesna Pesic,  a former party
president herself and an avid critic of the wanton state of intra-party democracy today,
the  lack  of  intra-party  democracy  “…was  understandable  when  the  only  goal  was
bringing down the Milosevic regime.  It  was not necessary to develop wider forms of
internal  democracy...”46 With  their  focus  on  hard-pressing  issues  such  as  coalition
formation  and  regime  change,  party  leaders  struggled  just  to  reach  compromises
amongst themselves, let alone their entire membership. The prospect of investing time
and energy into the means and methods of intra-party democracy would likely have been
unfathomable. 
40 All  the  more  surprising  then that  Serbia’s  first  party  statutes  awarded such  limited
powers to top party brass. The DS statute of 1990, for example, claimed its president’s sole
prerogative was that of calling the main board into session.47 The powers of the DSS
president were portrayed as similarly meager in the party’s first statute issued in 1992.
Over the course of the following decade, however, party statutes awarded an ever greater
array  of  powers  to  the  position of  party  president.  Thus  by  1998  the  DSS president
formally had the right to coordinate party work, to propose candidates for the executive
board and vice presidents, as well as to compose an electoral list of MPs. By 2001 he or she
was also awarded the power to initiate a procedure of dismissal of the party presidency,
council, and electoral board. Today, the president’s powers are even more impressive.
The increasing concentration of power in the hands of party leaders would indicate that
Serbia’s parties have becomes less, as opposed to more, democratic. Yet it also points to
one of the major problems of studying intra-party democracy during this period; parties’
first  statutes  were  essentially  fluid  documents  that  mimicked  trends  in  parties’
development but did little to regulate them. Far more so than today, these documents
were  inexplicit  with  regards  to  even  the  most  basic  details  of  internal  governance
processes,  such  as  the  exact  prerogatives  of  party  organs  or  the  manner  in  which
elections  were  conducted.  As  such,  a  comparative  analysis  of  intra-party  democracy
based on information obtained from party statutes is neither persuasive nor meaningful.
A  more  helpful  approach is  to  examine  the  evolution of  parties  as  this  occurred in
practice. This comparison can occur across parties over time (i.e. the evolution of parties
from 1990 -2000) as well as between them (i.e. parties formed before as compared to after
regime change).  The following pages begin with the former approach relying on each of
the three aspects of intra-party democracy discussed above. 
 
Selection Procedures
41 Selection procedures refer to the methods by which party leaders, candidates, and policy
are chosen. This paper has demonstrated that such procedures are, with few exceptions,
exclusive, centralized, and under-institutionalized. While improvements are notable with
regards to the matter of institutionalization (these processes having been largely devoid
of institutionalization in the 1990s), on the whole there has been little meaningful change
over the course of the past two decades.
42 If one looks, for example, at the process of leader selection one finds little evidence that
such  processes  have  changed  for  either  the  better  or  worse.  Measuring  levels  of
leadership  turnover  we  see  that  of  the  five  parties  operational  in  the  period
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between1990-2000  (DS,  DSS,  SPO,  SPS,  and  SRS),  just  one  experienced  a  change  in
leadership:  the  DS.  By  contrast,  in  the  post-2000  period,  three  of  our  seven  parties
witnessed a change in leadership: the DS, G17 Plus and SPS. Yet of these, the death of a
party leader prompted the transition in two of the three cases (Djindjic in the case of DS
and Milosevic in the case of the SPS). Only the G17 Plus’ transition from Miroljub Labus to
Mladjan Dinkic in 2006 is a legitimate instance of leadership turnover. 
43 Measurements  of  levels  of  intra-party  competition  show  equally  scant  evidence  of
organizational change.  In the 1990s it was common for parties to rely on what Vladimir
Goati calls ‘fictive’ opponents. Such individuals stood no chance of defeating sitting party
presidents but their candidacy awarded the electoral process an air of legitimacy. A prime
example of this phenomenon occurred in 1990 at the SPS’s first party assembly meeting.
Slobodan Milosevic’s  ‘opponent’,  Radmila  Andjelkovic,  conducted no campaign in the
run-up to elections and made no substantive case for her appointment. As a consequence,
few were surprised when she received a mere 66 votes to Milosevic’s 1228.48 Yet since
2000,  intra-party elections have become no more competitive.  In some cases,  parties
continue  to  rely  on  fictive  opponents,  while  in  most  they  simply  run  as  the  sole
candidate. The DSS’s Vojislav Kostunica, for example, has run unopposed for some 16
years. 
44 Perhaps the only party in Serbia whose electoral process is truly competitive is that of the
SPS. Following the death of Milosevic in 2006, the SPS underwent a period of profound
turmoil, during which the party split into two large blocs, one pro-reform and the other
anti-reform.  Until  the  staging of  presidential  election in  December  2006 it  remained
unclear which of these groups would prove victorious.49 The victory of Ivica Dacic—leader
of  the  party’s  pro-reformist  wing—marked the  first  time in  Serbia’s  post-communist
history that a major political party boasted truly competitive elections. Yet apart from
this  one example there is  little  reason to believe that  electoral  processes  have truly
democratized. Although the DS’s introduction of the primary system is certainly a major
step in the right direction, it has yet to be implemented and its impact can therefore not
yet be gauged.  
45 As pertains to candidate and policy selection, a similar pattern is evident. While the rules
governing such processes are no doubt better defined in contemporary statutes than they
were  a  decade  ago,  they  show  little  evidence  of  being  either  more  inclusive  or
decentralized. The selection of MPs, for example, remains a thoroughly top-down affair in
which average party members and local party branches simply have no say. 
46 The evolution of policy selection has proven equally slow going. While the introduction of
policy deliberation committees in the early 2000s adds some legitimacy to the process, it
remains unclear how these committees actually contribute to the policy-making process.
One might even argue that the process has become less inclusive, as NGOs continue to
play an ever marginal role in the formulation of party policy. In the late 1990s, non-
profits like the G17 (which later spun-off into the G17 Plus) and OTPOR played active roles
in the policy-making process. After 2000 however, such relationships cooled, in some
cases approaching outright hostility. Except in the case of the LDP, NGOs currently play
no formalized role in either the crafting or selection of policy.  The process has thus
become less inclusive in this respect.
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Accountability
47 Accountability is perhaps where parties fail most flagrantly. Today, as in years passed, the
means  and  methods  for  ensuring  that  party  leaders  stay  in  check  are  few  and  far
between.  Although  some  parties  have  added  clauses  to  their  statues  which  roughly
delineate how a party leader might be removed, no major party in Serbia—either in the
1990s or in the years that followed—has ever launched a procedure of no confidence,
despite that the 2000s have only offered members more reason to seek the ouster of their
leaders. Over the past five years, Vuk Draskovic has overseen his party’s decline from
prominence and Vojislav Seselj has been indicted for war crimes. Such phenomena would
seem to offer ample pause for party members. Apparently however, they do not. This
suggests that  greater  institutionalization  aside,  Serbia’s  parties  are  no  more  or  less
democratic with regards to standards of accountability than they were in the 1990s. 
 
Tolerance
48 On the matter of tolerance equally somber conclusions may be drawn. No doubt, in many
instances recent party statutes have drawn greater focus on the rights of party members,
particularly as concerns free speech. Parties such as the LDP and SPS are noteworthy for
the (comparatively) broad liberties they assign their members. Arguably the most truly
democratic party in this regards in the SPS. As a result of an almost 50:50 split within the
party, it has been forced to accommodate competing visions within its ranks. More than
any  other  party,  the  SPS  has  proved  adept  at  addressing  competing  interests  and
perspectives  without  forcing  its  (admittedly  large)  minority  to  branch  off  in  new
directions. 
49 One  might  argue  that  growing  tolerance  is  responsible  for  the  decline  in  party
fragmentation since 2000. During the 1990s, minority groups were incessantly branching
off  from  mother-parties  to  launching  rival  organizations.  The  DS,  for  example  was
directly responsible for having spawned three separate parties during this period. Thus,
in 1991 DS members formed the Serbian Liberal Party in protest of the DS’s decision to
partake in national elections. In 1992 Vojislav Kostunica and his followers formed the DSS
after the party refused to join the Democratic Movement of Serbia (DEPOS). Later in 1996,
the former president of DS, Dragoljub Micunovic, left the DS to form Democratic Center in
protest  of  what  he  saw to  be  Zoran  Djindjic’s  increasingly  nationalistic  tone.  These
parties,  in  turn,  became a  source  of  further  off-shoots.  Thus,  in  1997  after  the  DSS
declared its unwillingness to join ranks with Zajedno, members broke paths with their
party to form the Christian Democratic Party of Serbia. While the DS is certainly the most
notorious of Serbia’s parties with regards to the phenomenon of successor parties, it is
certainly not alone. The Civic Alliance of Serbia, for example, was also the source of three
different parties formed in the 1990s: the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina, the
National Peasant’s Party, and the Social Democratic Union. In 1995, members were put off
by  Vuk Draskovic’s  authoritarian  tendencies  and left  the  SPO to  form the  Assembly
National Party. Even the SPS, at the height of its powers in the early 1990s, could not
accommodate competing views. In 1992, a group of members left the party to form the
Social Democratic Party. 
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50 In  the  past  few  years,  the  number  of  parties  formed  as  off-shoots  has  dropped
considerably. The most recent examples are the creation of the LDP (an offshoot of DS),
the formation of the Serbian Democratic Renewal Movement (formerly of SPO), and Maja
Gojkovic’s citizens group (an offshoot of the SRS). On the surface, this would seem to
indicate that parties have become more accommodating of competing perspectives. More
likely,  however,  it  is  simply reflective of  the gradual institutionalization of the party
system. Disgruntled party members have little reason to suspect that spin-off parties will
be accompanied by greater electoral success. Instead of forming their own parties they
are more likely to follow the path taken by the former president of G17 Plus, Miroljub
Labus, and simply give up politics altogether.
51 One striking indication of just how intolerant political parties have become was witnessed
with the passing of  Serbia’s  first  post-Milosevic  constitution in 2006.  Art.  102 of  the
constitution states that an MP is “free to irrevocably put his/her term of office at disposal
to the political party upon which proposal he or she has been elected.”50 In contrast to the
1990s and early 2000s, Serbia’s parties thus currently have the right to revoke their MP’s
mandates at a time and place of their own choosing. In practical terms this means that
parties  are  fully  justified  in  demanding  that  parliamentary  candidates  sign  blank
resignations prior to taking office. Parties may publicize such resignations when an MP
fails to abide by the party’s ruling. Thus, MPs are no longer able to divert from party line
on  even  a  single  vote.   This  unprecedented  ruling  effectively  represents  the  further
institutionalization of the party’s power over individual party members. It is a major step
away from the further democratization of Serbia’s political parties.
52 A second, and final approach, by which to compare the periods prior and after regime
change is to contrast the parties formed in the 1990s (i.e. DS, DSS, SPO, SPS, SRS) to those
formed post-2000 (LDP and G17 Plus). There is little doubt that the parties formed after
2000 are, programmatically speaking, Serbia’s most progressive. Both the LDP and G17
Plus are staunch supporters of Serbia’s EU aspirations. Both have been firm advocates of
cooperation with the ICTY. The LDP, in particular, has awarded significant attention to
the protection of  minority  rights  in  Serbia.  Given their  programs,  one might  expect
similarly progressive organizational practices. Yet as tables 1 – 5 illustrate, they do not
perform  substantially  better  than  do  any  of  the  parties  examined  here,  with  the
exception of the SRS. As has been shown, governance processes of the LDP are highly
centralized. The party’s president is awarded substantial prerogatives, making the LDP
one  of  the  most  top-down  parties  examined  here.  Although  it  is  significantly  more
tolerant of internal dissent than are other parties—it is after all the only party in Serbia
which does not demand its MPs sign a blank resignation—this is the only area in which it
excels. The G17 Plus offers an interesting point of contrast. A few years older than the
LDP, the G17 Plus boasts more statutes through which to gauge the party’s organization
development. Over the years, these statutes indicate that internal governance processes
have become less inclusive and less tolerant over time. The G17 Plus’ current statute is in
fact the only statute in Serbia to explicitly mention MPs’ obligations to sign a contract
proclaiming their obedience to the party (the infamous blank resignation).  While the
powers of the president are substantially more limited in the G17 Plus than they are in
the LDP,  they are not more limited than,  say,  the powers of  the SPS president.  This
indicates that, on the whole, we should not expect parties established post-2000 to be
harbingers of greater internal democratization.
53 Conclusion
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54 Many of what are today Serbia’s most important parties can trace their roots to the
immediate post-communist period. Some of these parties led the way towards regime
change. Others sought to secure the status quo, ignoring calls for the democratization of
Serbia’s political life. Regardless, Serbia’s parties were and indeed remain internally un
democratic. This applies to all major parties in Serbia today, irrespective of ideology, age,
or size. There are few signs that Serbia’s parties are troubled by the status quo. To the
contrary, in many respects they have become less, rather than more, democratic over the
years. It is true that as time has passed, they have further institutionalized the rules and
regulations  of  internal  party  life.  But  this  has  often been at  the  expense  of  greater
inclusivity, hence the growing concentration of power in party leaders’ hands. Indeed,
the  evidence  suggests  that  the  onset  of  democracy  in  Serbia  did  little  to  spur  the
inception of democracy within Serbia’s foremost political parties. 
55 This is troubling for many reasons. Political apathy runs high throughout Serbia and a
lack of intra-party democracy does little to deter it. My own interviews with current and
former  party  members  exposed significant  disillusionment  with the  state  of  internal
party politics.  Few admitted to being part and parcel of the decision-making process.
Many expressed frustration at their own inability to bring about change and the top-
down manner in which decisions were made. As a consequence, quite a few of those with
whom I  spoke had either abandoned their  positions within their  parties  or  opted to
withdraw from party life at the time of writing. Parties’ habit of ostracizing their most
competent members only hampers the larger political process and arguably threatens the
longevity of democracy in Serbia. 
56 There is no doubt that Serbia has made considerable political progress over the course of
the decade. It is now time for the country’s political parties to make similar headway.
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ABSTRACTS
Has  the  onset  of  democracy  in  Serbia  facilitated  the  democratization  of  the  country’s  main
political parties? By most accounts, the answer is no. Robert Michels’ ‘iron law of oligarchy’ thus
appears all too relevant in a Serbian context. This paper seeks to understand whether and to
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what extent this remains the case in a post-Milosevic context.  Have Serbia’s  political  parties
evolved organizationally since the early 1990s? Are parties’ organizational structures uniformly
undemocratic or do differences exist with respect to different parties? To answer these questions
this paper relies on domestic media coverage, interview with party members, as well as party
statutes.
Est-ce que l'apparition de la démocratie en Serbie a facilité la démocratisation des principaux
partis politiques du pays? Selon la plupart des constats, la réponse est non. La «loi d'airain de
l'oligarchie» de Robert Michels apparaît donc tout aussi pertinente dans un contexte serbe. Cet
article cherche à comprendre si et dans quelle mesure cela reste le cas dans un contexte post-
Milosevic. Est-ce que les partis politiques de Serbie ont évolué sur le plan organisationnel depuis
le  début  des  années  1990?  Les  structures  organisationnelles  des  partis  sont-elles
antidémocratiques  de manière  uniforme  ou  bien  existe-t-il  des  différences  en  fonction  des
partis? Pour répondre à ces questions, cet article s'appuie sur les médias locaux, des entretiens
réalisés avec des membres de partis politiques, ainsi que les statuts de ces mêmes partis.
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